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On February 24, 2020, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
effected the Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Final Rule (Public Charge Rule). The 
Public Charge Rule denies admission or denial of application or petition for an extension of stay 
or a change of status to any noncitizen who is deemed likely at any time to become a “public 
charge.” A public charge determination is based on a noncitizen’s use of specified public 
benefits, including Medicaid. I argue that a mass disenrollment by immigrants from Medicaid 
will cause severe poor health outcomes and economic burden on their local communities. The 
Public Charge Rule will lead to a decrease in Medicaid and CHIP enrollment by millions of 
otherwise eligible, noncitizen immigrants and their U.S. citizen children and family members. In 
effect, a loss of insurance coverage will lead to the public health implication of widespread poor 
health outcomes. Lastly, the Public Charge Rule will cause downstream tax burdens on local 
economies due to a consequential rise in uncompensated care provided in hospitals. The Public 
Charge Rule’s alleged purposes purported by the former Trump administration are unfulfilled. 
Instead, the Public Charge Rule discriminates against immigrants based on their class and 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
In 2018, 44.8 million immigrants were living in the U.S., making up 13.7% of the 
nation’s population.1 Immigrants enrich our culture with diversity and offer productivity across a 
range of industries. Throughout history and now, Hispanic immigrants in particular have 
“afforded the United States myriad economic benefits, including lower prices for goods 
produced in industries that employ immigrant workers, increased demand for U.S. products, and 
higher wages and employment for domestic workers[;] … [they have] added significantly to the 
economic prosperity enjoyed by average Americans.”2 And yet, the U.S. government has 
exercised an ongoing, concerted effort to restrict immigration and limit immigrants’ rights. A 
recent change in immigration policy, the Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Final Rule 
(hereafter referred to as Public Charge Rule), has caused significant harm to the immigrant 
community.  
On February 24, 2020, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) put 
the Public Charge Rule into effect, which allows a denial of admission or denial of application or 
petition for an extension of stay or a change of status if the noncitizen is at any time likely to 
become a “public charge.” During a public charge determination, USCIS considers an applicant 
or petitioner’s enrollment in specified public benefit programs. The Public Charge Rule includes 
Medicaid as a public benefit considered during a public charge determination. Out of fear of 
losing status, many lawfully residing noncitizens are choosing to disenroll or not to enroll 
themselves and their children in Medicaid and CHIP. Uninsured adults and families have limited 
access to health care and are less likely to receive preventative medical services or care for 
                                                 
1 Abby Budiman et al., Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2018, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/20/facts-on-u-s-immigrants/. 




chronic and major health conditions. Discouraging legally residing noncitizens from 
participation in Medicaid and other public benefit programs could render a population of 
millions at risk of poor health outcomes. The Public Charge Rule disproportionately burdens 
vulnerable, racial minority populations, particularly the U.S. Hispanic population.3 This is 
especially important, as U.S. Hispanic people and other racial minorities have disproportionately 
suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic. A mass increase of uninsured noncitizens will also 
trigger significant downstream costs that will likely burden health care institutions and local 
economies.  
The former Trump administration was adamant the rule would protect American 
taxpayers and encourage self-sufficient success for immigrants. But the Public Charge Rule 
forces immigrants and immigrant families to choose between enrolling in necessary public 
benefits like Medicaid and risk being deemed a public charge, or disenrolling from public 
benefits to improve their chances of being able to remain in the U.S., but threaten their health 
status. The rule is discriminatory and unjustly penalizes lawfully residing immigrants of lower 
socioeconomic status (SES) who may need temporary public benefits. Ultimately, the Public 
Charge Rule has no just purpose, and will cause undue harm for millions of immigrants and their 
U.S. citizen family members.  
 
 
                                                 
3 For purposes of this Essay, I use the term “Hispanic” to refer to individuals originating from Latin America and 
Central America. The term “Hispanic” is interchangeable with “Latino/Latina.” The U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) defines the ethnicity ‘Hispanic or Latino’ as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or 
Central American, or other Spanish culture of origin, regardless of race.” About Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/population/hispanic-
origin/about.html#:~:text=OMB%20defines%20%22Hispanic%20or%20Latino,or%20origin%20regardless%20of%
20race (last visited April 10, 2021). 
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2.0 BACKGROUND  
2.1 The History of Racism in U.S. Immigration Law 
 
“[The] United States has an immigration dark side. A mean-spirited, anti-
immigrant impulse has sporadically gripped the nation, particularly during times 
of social stress. During these times, the U.S. immigration laws have been harsh, 
discriminatory, and aggressively enforced.” – Kevin Johnson, J.D.4 
 
Immigration law in the U.S. has a long history of discrimination against low-income, 
non-white people seeking residence and citizenship. It can be argued that immigration law itself 
was founded on a racist and classist philosophy. From its inception, immigration law has broadly 
intended to “marginali[ze] poor and working immigrants of color” and deny noncitizens full 
access to rights and services otherwise accessible to white citizens.5 Early immigration law and 
policy centered on the themes of “assimilation and integration” of immigrants into white, 
American society, in which assimilability was defined in “explicit racial terms.”6 The racial 
dichotomy between who is considered white versus non-white has shifted throughout history7 to 
accommodate the nation’s present collective understanding of who deserves citizenship and who 
should be “denied … full membership [into] American social life.”8 Although the racial targets 
shift over time, racist and classist rhetoric in immigration policy has proliferated into the present 
day.  
To illustrate, one of the first instances of legal immigrant discrimination in explicit racial 
terms is a 1791 federal statute that restricted naturalized citizenship in the U.S. to “only ‘free 
                                                 
4 KEVIN JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 
LAWS 2 (2007). 
5 Trina Jones, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 2 (2009).  
6 Katie Kelly, Enforcing Stereotypes: The Self-fulfilling prophecies of U.S. Immigration Enforcement, 66 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 36, 42 (2018).  
7 Id. at 42.  
8 Jones, supra note 5, at 2.   
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white persons[.]’”9 Another example, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, barred Chinese 
laborers from entry into the U.S. for 10 years, and prevented Chinese immigrants from acquiring 
naturalized citizenship;10 the admission bar continued until 1952 with the enactment of the 
McCarran-Walter Act.11 Further, the visa quota system was first established by the 1924 
Immigration Act, in which the number of visas awarded to immigrants from a particular country 
was based on the percentage of U.S. citizens with ancestral lineage from that country.12 
Historical scholars note that this quota system was an attempt to “preserve the ideal of U.S. 
homogeneity” and manifested a racially discriminatory intent in the quotas themselves.13 The 
national quota system was codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, but 
later dismantled in the amended INA of 1965 and replaced by a worldwide quota restriction on 
all immigrants.14  
2.1.1 Immigration from Latin America 
Between 1960 and 2010, Hispanic immigrants comprised between 31% and 41% of all 
new legal permanent residents in the U.S.15 Hispanic immigrants are people immigrating to the 
U.S. from Latin America, including countries in Central America and South America, as well as 
Mexico and the Caribbean.16 Hispanic immigration to the U.S. has been “part of a multiphasic 
demographic response to unequally distributed social and economic opportunities . . . determined 
by micro and macro-level” triggers, such as civil wars, natural disasters, political instability, and 
economic downturn.17 To illustrate, Columbian migration in the 20th Century was primarily 
                                                 
9 Id.  
10 Kelly, supra note 6, at 43. 
11 Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After “9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 315, 323 (2003). 
12 Kelly, supra note 6, at 44.  
13 Id.  
14 Boswell, supra note 11, at 328.  
15 Tienda & Sanchez, supra note 2.  
16 Id.   
17 Id.  
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fueled by “prolonged political instability, armed conflict and drug violence amid sporadic 
economic downturns.”18 Likewise, civil wars, political instability, and failing economies caused 
significant migration from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.19 
Migration from Latin America is also rooted in rigorous U.S. policy measures designed to 
regulate admissions, beginning with the aforementioned quota system of the Immigration Act of 
1924.20 Interestingly, the 1924 Act explicitly exempted independent countries in Central and 
South America from the quotas, including Mexico and the Dominican Republic, subsequently 
fueling major Hispanic immigration throughout the 20th Century.21 Another example of a U.S. 
policy measure is the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which caused significant migration 
from Cuba after the Cuban Revolution; the Act “allowed Cuban exiles to apply for permanent 
residence” after living in the U.S. for one year.22 Throughout the 20th Century, immigration law 
directed toward Latin American countries has been “applied in a capricious or discriminatory 
manner.”23 Nothing illustrates this notion better than U.S. immigration policy toward Mexico. 
Although Mexican immigration policy is only a partial representation of Hispanic immigration, it 
demonstrates the characteristic unfairness that defines U.S. immigration policy toward Hispanic 
people.24 
                                                 
18 Id.  
19 Id. “Emigration from El Salvador, the smallest but most densely populated of the Central American republics, is 
particularly noteworthy because of the sheer numbers that received LPR status – over 215,000 during the 1980s and 
an additional half million over the next two decades.” “[Guatemala] witnessed prolonged civil conflict, which 
escalated after 1978 and initiated a mass exodus of asylum seekers during 1980s and 1990s.” “By 2010 Guatemala 
became the fourth largest Latin-American-born group in the United States.” Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
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Immigration policy specific to Mexican immigrants has oscillated between exclusion and 
free immigration dependent on the economic needs of the day.25 Mexican immigrants have 
comprised the largest percentage of legal immigration from Latin America, accounting for 40% 
to 60% of all new legal permanent pesidents from Latin America between the 1960s and 1990s.26 
Between 1900 and 1924, businesses in the western U.S. “vigorously recruited Mexican labor” to 
fulfil labor shortages created by the exclusion of other racial groups.27 Public sentiment toward 
Mexican immigrants became hostile with the stock market crash in 1929 as white Americans 
blamed them for “‘taking away jobs from Americans … [and] living off public relief.’”28 As a 
result, Congress made huge efforts in the 1930s to deport “nearly a half-million Mexican-
Americans, including U.S. citizens” under the repatriation campaign,29 thereby reducing the 
overall Mexican population in the U.S. by 41%.30 Nevertheless, mobilization for World War II 
created yet again a shortage of cheap agricultural labor, and 168,000 Mexican laborers were 
recruited under Roosevelt’s bracero program between 1942 and 1945.31 In 1951 Congress gave 
the bracero program a permanent statutory basis in Public Law 78;32 although the law increased 
the number of visas for Mexican laborers to 200,000, the number of undocumented immigrants 
present in the U.S. began to rise.33 The recession following the Korean War led to another anti-
immigration movement, and over one million undocumented Mexican immigrants were deported 
                                                 
25 David B. Oppenheimer, et al., Playing the Trump Card: The Enduring Legacy of Racism in Immigration Law, 26 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 1, 35 (2016).  
26 Tienda & Sanchez, supra note 2. 
27 Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 36.  
28 Id. at 37.  
29 Boswell, supra note 11, at 325.  
30 Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 37.  
31 Id.  
32 DOUGLASS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 36 (2002). 
33 Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 38.  
 7 
 
under “Operation Wetback” in 1954.34 Nonetheless, nearly 5 million Mexican laborers were 
recruited by agricultural employers through the bracero program until its completion in 1965.  
The following decade was rife with state legislatures attempting to pass anti-immigrant 
state laws.35 In Plyler v. Doe for example, a Texas statute withheld educational funding and 
denied school enrollment to children illegally admitted into the U.S., but the Supreme Court 
found the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and struck it down in 1982.36 Subsequent 
federal acts including the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 and the 
Immigration Act of 1990 attempted to slow Mexican immigration by reducing immigrant 
benefits, tightening admissibility, increasing costs and sanctions on employers, streamlining 
criminal procedure, and increasing penalties for immigration violations.37 The U.S.’s legacy of 
erratic admission and exclusion of Mexican immigrants, and the “unprecedented geographic 
dispersal of Latin American immigrants” over the 20th Century has created widespread anti-
Hispanic and anti-immigration sentiment.38 As a result, U.S. immigration law has fundamentally 
normalized racism toward Hispanic immigrants while simultaneously making significant efforts 
to strip basic rights from immigrants residing here.  
2.1.2 Denying Public Benefits— PROWRA 
Immigration law codified in the 20th Century has had nonpartisan Congressional support 
to restrict immigrant entry and access to public benefits. Relevant to the discussion of the Public 
Charge Rule is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PROWRA).39 Signed into law by former President Bill Clinton, the statute’s 14th chapter, titled 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 38.  
36 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
37 Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 39.  
38 Tienda & Sanchez, supra note 2. 
39 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.  
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“Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens,” stripped all non-qualified aliens from 
eligibility for “any Federal public benefit” and “any State or local public benefit” as defined in 
the Act.40 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpretation of “federal public 
benefit” included several integral health care coverage programs to be within the definition, 
including Medicare, Medicaid, Refugee Medical Assistance, and state Child Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP).41 The law made undocumented immigrants ineligible for all state and local 
public benefits unless the presiding state passed a new law after August 22, 1996 that 
affirmatively granted eligibility.42 PROWRA further created barriers to accessing federal 
benefits for lawful immigrants upon entry to the U.S. The law banned most lawful immigrants 
from receiving federal public benefits for a 5-year period from the date of entry with a qualified 
alien status; banned benefits include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
Medicaid, CHIP, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits (food stamps) 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).43 As a result, PROWRA caused both lawful 
immigrants (for the initial 5-year period) and undocumented immigrants to have only limited 
access to specified public resources, such as Medicaid payments for emergency services for 
those who are “otherwise eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status” (emphasis 
                                                 
40 8 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1611a, 1621a (1996). “State or local public benefit” is defined as: “(A) any grant, contract, loan, 
professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated 
funds of a State or local government; and B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or 
assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local 
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.” Id. “Federal public benefit” is defined as: “ 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States 
or by appropriated funds of the United States; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted 
housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which 
payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United 
States or by appropriated funds of the United States.” Id.  
41 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, Summary of Immigrant Eligibility Restrictions Under Current Law (Feb. 25, 2009), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/summary-immigrant-eligibility-restrictions-under-current-law. 
42 Id.   
43 Id.  
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added).44 The Public Charge Rule further broadened PROWRA’s impact by creating a greater 
disincentive for immigrants to enroll in public benefits, or risk losing their immigration status. 
2.2 Public Charge Final Rule Defined  
On February 24, 2020, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
effected the “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds” final rule. To determine whether an 
alien is admissible to the U.S. or eligible for an adjustment of immigration status, USCIS looks 
to factors outlined in 8 C.F.R. 212.22 in order to designate whether an immigrant “is likely at 
any time to become a public charge.” The primary statutory authority for the Public Charge Rule 
is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), as amended.45 Section 212(a)(4) of the 
INA, codified in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), states, "[any] alien who, in the opinion of the consular 
officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time 
of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public 
charge is inadmissible."46 The initial proposal for the rule referred to an 1882 statutory provision 
that required most nonimmigrants seeking temporary admission to the U.S. to show they were 
not “likely to become a public charge;” though, the 1882 provision never defined the phrase.47 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed to define the term with the new rule, and 
applied the definition to section 212(a)(4) of the INA.48 Under the final rule, DHS defined the 
phrase “likely at any time to become a public charge” to mean “more likely than not any time in 
                                                 
44 Health Coverage of Immigrants, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-
Health-Coverage-for-Immigrants.  
45 Final Rule on Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV. (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/final-rule-on-public-charge-ground-of-inadmissibility. 
46 Id.; Final Rules on Public Charge Determination, NAFSA (Mar. 29, 2021) https://www.nafsa.org/regulatory-
information/final-rules-public-charge-determinations [hereinafter NAFSA] (citing 8 USC 1182 (a)(4)).  
47 Shawn Fremstad, Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule Would Radically Change Legal Immigration, CTR. FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2018/11/27/461461/trumps-public-charge-rule-radically-
change-legal-immigration/. 
48 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114 (Dec. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 CFR 103).  
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the future to receive one or more of the public benefits” for a time period of more than 12 
months, within any 36-month period.49 
The Public Charge Rule prescribes how an alien may be inadmissible to the U.S. “based 
on the likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future.”50 Furthermore, the rule 
requires a lawful immigrant seeking an extension of stay or a change of status to “demonstrate 
that they have not received public benefits over the designated threshold since obtaining the 
nonimmigrant status they seek to extend or change.”51 The new rule requires DHS and the 
Department of State (DOS) to weigh all specified factors and use of public benefits as a “totality 
of an alien’s circumstances” review 52 to make a prospective determination of whether 
applications are accepted or denied.53  
The Public Charge Rule applies to applicants for admission, “adjustment of status to that 
of a lawful permanent resident,” and “extension of nonimmigrants stay or change of 
nonimmigrant status[.]”54 This specifically includes applicants seeking immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas, adjustment of status, admission as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, lawful 
permanent residents returning to the U.S. after an absence of 6 months or longer, and 
nonimmigrant change of status and extension of status.55 Factors considered by USCIS during a 
                                                 
49 Public Charge Fact Sheet, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/public-charge-fact-sheet. 
50 USCIS Announces Public Charge Rule Implementation Following Supreme Court Stay of Nationwide Injunctions, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-announces-
public-charge-rule-implementation-following-supreme-court-stay-nationwide-injunctions. 
51 Id. 
52 Public Charge Fact Sheet, supra note 49.  
53 NAFSA, supra note 46.  
54 Public Charge Fact Sheet, supra note 49. 
55 “Nonimmigrants presenting themselves at a port of entry are always considered as applying for admission to the 
United States;” permanent residents returning after an absence of 6 months or less are not subject to the rule; the 
inquiry for change of status and extension of stay applicants is not the full "totality of the circumstances" assessment 
of future likelihood of becoming a public charge that visa applicants, adjustment of status applicants, and applicants 
for admission at a port of entry are subjected to. Rather, it is a backward-looking inquiry to ascertain if the COS or 
EOS applicant actually received one of the specific public benefits "for more than 12 months in the aggregate within 
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review include, but are not limited to: age, health, “assets, resources, and financial status,” 
education and skills, prospective immigration status, and expected period of admission.56 Public 
benefits considered by USCIS during a review include:  
• Supplemental Security Income;  
• Temporary Assistance for Needy Families;  
• Any federal, state, local, or tribal cash benefit programs for income maintenance;  
• Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [(food stamps)];  
• Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance; 
• Public Housing; and 
• Medicaid.57  
In September 2019, the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that nearly 80% of immigrants 
without legal permanent residence status had at least 1 characteristic that is weighed negatively 
on a DHS public charge review.58 
The final rule outlines exclusions for specific aliens, and specific public benefits and 
Medicaid benefits that are not to be considered during a review. Public benefits not considered 
include:  
• Disaster relief;  
• National school lunch programs;  
• The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children;  
                                                 
any 36-month period" since obtaining the nonimmigrant status that he or she seeks to extend, or from which he or 
she seeks to change.” NAFSA, supra note 46. 
56 Public Charge Fact Sheet, supra note 49. 
57 Id.  
58 Samantha Artiga & Maria Diaz, Health Coverage and Care of Undocumented Immigrants, KAISER FAMILY 




• The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP);  
• Subsidies for foster care and adoption;  
• Government-subsidized student and mortgage loans;  
• Energy assistance;  
• Food pantries and homeless shelters; and  
• Head Start.59  
Medicaid benefits not considered include:  
• Treatment of emergency medical conditions;  
• Services or benefits provided in connection with the individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act;  
• School-based services or benefits provided to individuals who are at or below the oldest 
age eligible for secondary education as determined under state or local law;  
• Use by aliens under the age of 21; and  
• Use by pregnant women and by women within the 60-day period beginning on the last 
day of the pregnancy.”60  
Lastly, Congress exempted refugees, asylees, “certain T and U nonimmigrant visa applicants 
(human trafficking and certain crime [victims)]”, and “[c]ertain self-petitioners under the 
Violence Against Women Act” from the Public Charge Rule.61  
2.1 Public Charge Rule Litigation History 
                                                 
59 Public Charge Fact Sheet, supra note 49. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. If any of these exempted parties wanted to adjust their status to become a Lawful Permanent Resident in the 
future this rule would govern their behavior too.  
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Since its adoption in late 2019, the Public Charge Rule has had a dynamic litigation 
history, having been challenged in several federal courts. The Public Charge Rule was first 
proposed by DHS on October 10, 2018 with its publication in the Federal Register.62 The public 
submitted over 260,000 comments over the 2- month public comment period, closing on 
December 10, 2018.63 DHS published the Public Charge Final Rule on August 14, 2019 in the 
Federal Register, with an effective date of October 15, 2019.64 Two months later, DOS published 
the Public Charge Interim Final Rule in the Federal Register on October 11th, with an effective 
date of October 15, 2019.65 Between October 11-14, 2019, several courts issued preliminary 
injunctions of the Interim Final Public Charge Rule in anticipation of its adoption.66 The U.S. 
District Judge Phyllis Hamilton of California ruled that the plaintiffs were “likely to succeed on 
the merits with respect their claim that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious” based on their 
arguments that DHS failed to consider costs and benefits concerning “evidence when estimating 
disenrollment figures” and “concerns about health effects like disease outbreak.”67 The U.S. 
District Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson of Washington issued a nationwide injunction ruling 
that DHS had failed to cite statutory authority, “legislative history, or other resource that 
supports the interpretation that Congress has delegated to DHS the authority to expand the 
definition of who is inadmissible as a public charge[.]”68 
                                                 
62 Public Charge Timeline, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Feb. 2021), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2021.03_ilrc-public_charge_timeline-horizontal_0.pdf. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Preliminary Injunction at 53, City and County of San Francisco, et al. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, et al., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-cv-04717-PJH, No. 19-cv-04975-PJH, No. 19-cv-
04980-PJH), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/120%20Order%20re%20PI.pdf.  
68 Laurel Wamsley et al., Federal Judges In 3 States Block Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule For Green Cards, NPR 




On January 27, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court lifted the last remaining injunction 
blocking the Public Charge Rule’s inception.69 That same day, DHS announced the Rule would 
take effect on February 24, 2020 nationwide except Illinois.70 On February 20, 2020, DOS also 
announced the Rule would take effect for consular offices on February 24, 2020.71 The following 
day, the Supreme Court ruled that the Rule would also take effect in Illinois.72 On February 24, 
2020, both the DHS and DOS Public Charge Final Rules went into effect nationwide.73  
The final Public Charge Rule was implemented amidst the early stages of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Just one day after the Rule’s effective date, Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases predicted 
COVID-19 was “heading toward pandemic status.”74 On March 11, 2020, the World Health 
Organization officially declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and on March 13th, former President 
Donald Trump declared COVID-19 a national emergency.75 By June 10, 2020, the number of 
confirmed COVID-19 cases in the U.S. reached 2 million.76 In response to the COVID-19 
national emergency, both the DHS and DOS Public Charge Rule were enjoined nationwide on 
July 29, 2020. On August 12, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited the 
July injunction to only New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. On September 11, 2020, the 
Second Circuit granted the government’s motion to lift the July injunction nationwide for the 
DHS Rule.  
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But, on November 2, 2020 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
vacated the DHS Rule nationwide, declaring that the Rule could not be applied in any cases.77 
The Federal District Judge Gary Feinerman held that “[given] the Seventh Circuit’s holding that, 
despite the Supreme Court’s stay, the Final Rule was substantively and procedurally invalid 
under the APA and preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate” the court would “not stay its 
vacatur of the Rule.”78 The court entered a judgment vacating the Final Rule under a Rule 54(b) 
judgement, to proceed in litigation on an equal protection claim.79 This vacatur was short-lived, 
however, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a temporary, administrative stay on the 
order vacating the Rule the following day.80 On November 19th, the Seventh Circuit granted a 
stay pending appeal, replacing the November 3rd administrative stay. The November 3rd and 19th 
stays allowed DHS to continue implementing the Rule nationwide, during the appeal of the 
district court’s decision.81 On December 2, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
injunctions against the Rule issued by California and Washington federal courts; however, the 
injunctions were not put into effect until the mandate issued.82 Under former President Trump, 
the federal government moved to stay the issuance of the Ninth Circuit mandate until the 
Supreme Court heard and could rule on the government’s petition.83 On January 20, 2021, the 
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Ninth Circuit granted the motion to stay, which effectively “[put on hold] the ability of the Biden 
Administration to enforce the injunctions.”84  
 Several critical advancements have occurred with the Public Charge Rule during the 
writing of this Essay between February 2020 and March 2021. Changes made regarding the 
Public Charge Rule since the start of the Biden presidency are discussed in Section 6 
Immigration Reform with the Biden Administration.  
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3.0 ISSUE  
3.1 Medicaid Disenrollment  
The Public Charge Rule will likely cause a significant decrease in Medicaid enrollment 
by otherwise eligible immigrants and their family members, who may be U.S. citizens. The 
Public Charge Rule is likely to create broad “confusion and fear” across immigrant families 
about use and enrollment in public benefits for themselves and their children, regardless of 
whether the Rule directly impacts them.85 Many individuals in the U.S. “live in mixed 
immigration status families that may include lawfully present immigrants, undocumented 
immigrants, and/or citizens.” As a result, anecdotal reports show that noncitizens are choosing to 
disenroll or not to enroll themselves and their children, regardless of their child’s immigration or 
citizenship status, in Medicaid and CHIP “due to fears and uncertainty” surrounding the Public 
Charge Rule.86 Although the Rule exempts CHIP from the public benefits considered in a public 
charge determination, many noncitizens fear that enrolling their U.S. citizen children in CHIP 
could threaten other family members’ immigration status.87 Medicaid is a public insurance 
program that provides coverage for eligible, “low-income people, families and children, pregnant 
women, the elderly, and people with disabilities.”88 CHIP is a “joint federal and state program 
that provides health coverage to uninsured children in families with incomes too high to qualify 
for Medicaid, but too low to afford private coverage.”89   
News reports have called this phenomenon the Public Charge Rule’s “chilling effect,” 
where an estimated 23 million noncitizens and their citizen family members using public benefits 
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could disenroll from crucial benefit programs.90 Prior to the Public Charge Rule, over 13.5 
million Medicaid and CHIP enrollees (both citizen and noncitizen), including 7.6 million 
children, lived in a household with at least one noncitizen.91 Medicaid disenrollment rates 
ranging from as low as 15% to 35% could account for a total disenrollment of 2.0 to 4.7 million 
noncitizens and citizens living in a mixed-status family from Medicaid and CHIP.92 A 2019 
survey found that one in five adults in low-income immigrant families with children reported 
avoiding public benefit programs for fear of risking future green card status.93 Research also 
suggests that fear of deportation is causing mixed status families to reject utilizing health care 
programs and services altogether for both themselves and their children, who are primarily U.S.- 
born citizens.94 Out of 20 organizations who work with documented and undocumented 
immigrants, 17 reported witnessing legally eligible families either declining to enroll or 
disenrolling from public benefit programs, including Medicaid and CHIP.95 Health care 
providers reported related concerns about parents disenrolling their children from CHIP and food 
assistance programs.96  
It is imperative to emphasize that the chilling effect is causing a broader disenrollment 
from public benefit programs than DHS intended. As stated, noncitizen parents are disenrolling 
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their citizen and noncitizen children from CHIP out of fear that their own status could be 
jeopardized. In 2017, nearly 25% of U.S. children, close to 19 million, had an immigrant 
parent.97 About 13% of U.S. children, almost 10 million, were U.S. citizens with a noncitizen 
parent.98 The chilling effect of the Public Charge Rule could lead to millions of U.S. citizen 
children to lose health insurance. Furthermore, U.S. citizen adults are disenrolling from public 
benefit programs out of fear that their enrollment could jeopardize the status of their noncitizen 
family members. These phenomena are particularly significant because the Public Charge Rule 
does not apply to U.S. citizens, nor does enrollment in public benefits by a citizen family 
member affect a noncitizen family member’s potential public charge determination. Also, CHIP 
is not a designated public benefit considered during a USCIS public charge determination, and 
therefore the Public Charge Rule does not consider a noncitizen child’s enrollment in CHIP. 
Therefore, both disenrollment in public benefits by U.S. citizens and CHIP disenrollment are 
unexpected and unintended consequences of the Public Charge Rule.  
A disenrollment of millions from Medicaid will have severe consequences for the health 
and safety of immigrant and mixed-status families. Mass Medicaid and CHIP disenrollment will 
cause a rise in uninsured adults and children, which leads to the downstream effects of increased 
poor health outcomes and uncompensated medical care. The economic burden of direct unmet 
costs of uncompensated care will inevitably shift to local economies and ultimately burden U.S. 
taxpayers.  
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3.2 Impacts on the Hispanic Population    
The growing U.S. Hispanic population stands to suffer significantly without the aid of 
Medicaid and other public benefits. The Hispanic population is “the largest and fastest-growing 
minority group” in the nation and comprises a large proportion of immigrants entering the U.S.99 
In 2018, half of the U.S. foreign-born population identified as Hispanic – 25% originating from 
Mexico, and 25% from other Latin American countries.100 Approximately 34% of the total 
Hispanic population in 2018 were immigrants.101 Moreover, almost one third (31.4%) of the 
percentage of immigrants arriving to the U.S. in 2018 identified as Hispanic.102 A total of 60.6 
million Hispanic people live in the U.S. as of July 1, 2019, accounting for 18.5% of the total 
nation’s population.103 
3.2.1 Hispanic Poverty & Dependence on Medicaid  
The U.S. Hispanic population has a disproportionately higher rate of poverty compared to 
other racial groups. In effect, Hispanic people are particularly dependent on Medicaid for health 
care coverage. Hispanic people are 1.5 times more likely to experience poverty than the general 
population.104 Although Hispanic people comprise 18.7%105 of the population, they account for 
28.1% of the nation’s total population in poverty.106 In 2018, 18% of foreign-born Hispanic 
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people lived under the poverty line.107 Further, 71% of foreign-born Hispanic people age 25 and 
older had an educational attainment of a high school diploma or less.108 Low educational 
attainment is often a risk factor for poverty, and those living in poverty must depend on public 
benefits, like Medicaid, to survive. Medicaid provided coverage to 17.3 million Hispanic people 
in 2018, accounting for almost one third of all Medicaid enrollees that year.109 Medicaid also 
covers more than half of all Hispanic children, making Medicaid a particularly crucial benefit for 
Hispanic families.110 
3.2.2 Hispanic People are Losing Health Care Coverage  
A loss of Medicaid further exacerbates the issue of low insurance rates among the 
Hispanic population. When compared to other racial groups, Hispanic people are less likely to 
have health care coverage, and consequently have less access to high-quality health care.111 
Currently, Hispanic people are 3 times more likely than non-Hispanic whites, and nearly 2 times 
more likely than blacks to be uninsured.112 The uninsured rate among the Hispanic population 
has been particularly unsteady within the past decade. With the onset of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), from 2010 and 2016 non-elderly Hispanic people experienced the largest percentage 
point decrease in uninsured rate compared to other racial groups, falling from 32.6% to 19.1%.113 
Between 2018 and 2019, however, the non-elderly Hispanic uninsured rate increased by 1% 
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from 10.3 million to 10.9 million (19.0% to 20.0%).114 This additional 612,000 uninsured 
Hispanic people, including 217,000 Hispanic children, accounted for more than half (57.0%) of 
the 1.1 million increase in the total uninsured population comprising all racial groups in 2019.115 
Data shows that the decline in coverage for Hispanic people was primarily due to a decline in 
Medicaid coverage.116 Sources indicate that this recent 1% coverage loss by Hispanic people is 
likely in response to “growing immigration-related fears,” due particularly in part to the Public 
Charge Rule.117  
 3.2.3 Hispanic Health Outcomes  
Although Hispanic people have on average lower incomes and worse access to health 
care than non-Hispanic racial groups, they are less likely to die from many leading causes of 
death, including heart disease and cancer, compared to non-Hispanic whites.118 One explanation 
for this phenomenon is the heterogeneity of the Hispanic population, as Hispanic people 
originate from more than 20 countries and have differing social circumstances.119 Nevertheless, 
Hispanic people face particular barriers to accessing health care and suffer poorer health 
outcomes on several measures compared to non-Hispanics.120 Half of Hispanic people in the U.S. 
will develop diabetes in their lifetime, and they are 50% more likely to die from diabetes than 
non-Hispanic whites.121 Further, Hispanic people have a “66% greater risk of developing type 2 
diabetes” and present worse health outcomes when diagnosed compared to non-Hispanic 
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whites.”122 Hispanic people also exhibit higher prevalence rates of both chronic kidney disease 
and cirrhosis, at 14.8% compared to 10% for non-Hispanic whites. Health status also differs 
greatly depending on the country of origin. For example, the infant mortality rate for Puerto 
Ricans was more than double the rate for Mexicans, at 7.2 deaths per 1,000 live births compared 
to 3.0 deaths per 1,000 live births.123 Health behaviors and outcomes are also generally worse for 
Hispanic people born in the U.S. compared to foreign-born Hispanic people.124 
Hispanic people experience particular challenges to achieving good health when 
considering their social determinants of health. As previously noted, Hispanic people experience 
high rates of poverty and exhibit the lowest rates of health insurance coverage of all major racial 
groups.125 Poverty often leads to issues of food insufficiency and obesity.126 Mexican American 
families report “not having sufficient food to eat sometimes” at much higher rates than non-
Hispanic white families.127 On the other hand, obesity is much more prevalent among Hispanic 
people, particularly among Hispanic women.128 One third of Mexican women are obese 
compared to one-fifth of non-Hispanic white women.129 Hispanic women are also twice as likely 
as Hispanic men to experience high blood pressure.130 As I will note in Section 4.2, lacking 
insurance coverage is linked to worse health outcomes primarily because uninsured individuals 
do not receive adequate health care. Due to low insurance rates, Hispanic people are less likely to 
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seek preventative care services compared to non-Hispanic whites.131 The health care system is 
also frequently less accessible to Hispanic people due to language barriers, as nearly one third 
are not fluent in English.132  
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4.0 ANALYSIS  
4.1 Classism & Racial Injustice: The Proposed Purpose of the Rule is Unfulfilled 
The Public Charge Rule’s initial rule proposal published on October 10, 2018 does little 
to explain why DHS proposed the Rule. In the proposed Rule’s section “Background and 
Purpose of the Rule,” DHS stated that “there is a lack of academic literature and economic 
research examining the link between immigration and public benefits. . . and the strength of that 
connection.”133 Furthermore, DHS stated that they did not “estimate potential lost productivity, 
health effects, additional medical expenses due to delayed heath care treatment, or increased 
disability insurance claims as a result of [the] proposed rule.”134 Instead, the former Trump 
administration announced the purpose of the proposed Public Charge Rule in several anecdotal 
public statements. When considering the Public Charge Rule’s actual outcomes, however, the 
anecdotal statements are incorrect and instead suggest a classist and racist motivation behind the 
Rule.  
4.1.1 PURPORTED PURPOSE OF THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE  
On August 12, 2019, USCIS former Director Ken Cuccinello, as part of DHS, gave a 
press briefing to explain and justify the purpose of the Public Charge Rule.135 Cuccinello first 
stated that the issued Rule “encourages and ensures self-reliance and self-sufficiency” for 
noncitizens seeking to enter and stay in the U.S.136 He further claimed the Public Charge Rule 
would “help promote immigrant success” as they seek opportunity.137 Throughout the briefing, 
Cuccinello repeatedly presented the ideas of “self-sufficiency” and “personal responsibility” as 
both an ideal for immigrants and necessary to ensure that “immigrants are able to support 
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themselves and become successful.”138 Cuccinello stressed that noncitizens should rely only on 
family and community sponsors and criticized a reliance on government aid.139 He narrated this 
point through a tale of his own immigrant family history, claiming that his “family worked 
together to ensure that they could provide for their own needs, and they never expected the 
government to do it for them.”140 He likened a financial reliance on family to a “hardworking 
spirit,” and touted this characteristic to be “central to our American identity.”141 He concluded 
the briefing with a lofty notion that Americans and legal immigrants alike have “pulled 
themselves up by their bootstraps” in order to achieve success.142   
On February 22, 2020, former White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham made a 
statement after the Supreme Court lifted the injunction on the Public Charge Rule. Among 
alleged benefits of the Public Charge Rule, Grisham stated the final Rule would “protect 
hardworking American taxpayers,” and “re-establish the fundamental legal principle” that 
immigrants “should be financially self-reliant and not dependent on the largess of [U.S.] 
taxpayers.”143 
4.1.2 Discussion 
Statements made by the former Trump administration seem to suggest that the Public 
Charge Rule was promulgated for the overarching purposes of encouraging immigrant success 
and protecting American taxpayers. In practice, however, neither of these objectives are satisfied. 
Cuccinello’s statements in particular are both derogatory and discriminate against many 
noncitizens who are subject to the public charge determination. Cuccinello praises immigrants 
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who are financially self-sufficient and claims that reliance on government aid is quintessentially 
“unamerican;” while on average, 52.2 million (or 21.3%) of the U.S. population participate in 
one or more federal assistance programs per month.144 If self-sufficiency was the true purpose, 
the Public Charge Rule effectively discriminates against noncitizens of lower-income, whereas 
noncitizens with higher-incomes fit the so-called “American ideal.” Next, the purpose of 
protecting U.S. taxpayers is unfounded and likely false. Explained later in Part 4.4 of the 
Analysis section, the vast majority of costs for uncompensated medical care are paid for by local 
taxpayers through higher tax rates. The downstream effects of the Public Charge Rule will likely 
burden U.S. taxpayers even more than before the Rule was in place. Both proposed purposes of 
the Public Charge Rule are without merit, and the Rule itself does not achieve its supposed 
objectives.  
When considering the outcomes of the Public Charge Rule, the true purpose behind the 
Rule’s inception is far more troubling. Public benefits are typically used by low-income, low-
socioeconomic status (SES) individuals in periods of financial need or instability. Therefore, the 
Public Charge Rule discriminates against low-SES immigrants in favor of higher-SES 
immigrants by restricting eligibility to enter or remain in this country only for lower-income 
immigrants. The Rule also penalizes low-SES immigrants who seek to enter or remain in the 
U.S. through lawful channels. A low-SES immigrant could be disincentivized from entering the 
U.S. legally or remaining legally, since immigrants deemed likely to become a public charge are 
inadmissible, and use of public benefits could jeopardize a residing immigrant’s status. To avoid 
the threat of deportation based on a public charge determination, low-SES immigrants are more 
likely to enter or remain in the U.S. illegally. In effect, the Public Charge Rule will further 
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exacerbate the ongoing issue of illegal immigration. Lastly, the Public Charge Rule has negative 
economic, health, and social consequences for legal immigrants already residing in the U.S., 
citizen children of noncitizen parents, and local communities. The former Trump administration 
superficially expected noncitizen immigrants to “succeed” once removed from public benefits. In 
truth, the Rule filters out low-income immigrants to allow only those with wealth to stay, and 
denies those who are less fortunate. Low-SES immigrants who choose to disenroll from public 
benefits to keep their status will likely face the consequences of serious health problems and 
financial risk.  
4.2 The Rule Will Cause Poor Health Outcomes for Disenrolled Adults & Children 
The Public Charge Rule considers Medicaid enrollment as a negative factor toward a 
noncitizen’s determination of admissibility. Medicaid is a public insurance program intended to 
help low-income families access health care. A person’s SES, their social standing or class, is 
intimately connected to his or her health status.145 The literature demonstrates that acquiring 
health insurance coverage leads to improved health outcomes.146 Removing Medicaid eligibility 
from noncitizens will put already vulnerable, low-SES families at risk of poorer health outcomes. 
4.2.1 Scope of Medicaid  
Medicaid was specifically designed to expand access to affordable health care for the 
U.S. population with low-income.147 States elect to participate in Medicaid and have 
considerable leeway to design their medical assistance programs; but, those who participate are 
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required to provide a foundation of basic health care services to recipients.148 All 50 States have 
opted to participate in a State Medicaid program; as of April 2021, 39 States (including D.C.) 
have expanded Medicaid, and 12 states have not adopted expansion.149 States that have chosen to 
expand Medicaid must cover nonelderly adults with income up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL).150 States that have not expanded Medicaid institute their own FPL percentage for 
Medicaid eligibility.151 The 2021 FPL for an individual is an annual income of $12,880.152 To 
illustrate, an individual must earn $17,774.40 per year or less to be eligible for Medicaid in a 
State with a qualifying FPL of 138%.  
 4.2.2 Socioeconomic Status & Health Status  
 It is well established that an individual’s SES and health status are tightly correlated.153 
SES has bidirectional effects, such that poor health may cause declines in income or loss of 
employment, and likewise poverty generates poor health outcomes.154 In fact, socioeconomic 
disadvantage can have a “continuing and cumulative effect” when faced throughout an 
individual’s lifetime.155 Experiencing low-SES during childhood may affect health status in 
adulthood.156 Poverty, low educational attainment, and economic hardship are associated “with 
higher rates of chronic illness, poor self-reported health status, disability, and lower life 
expectancy.”157   
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4.2.3 Health Outcomes of Uninsured Adults  
 A loss of insurance is a major barrier to accessing health care services for low-income 
individuals. Insurance both increases one’s likelihood of using medical care and facilitates the 
appropriate use of health care services.158 Uninsured individuals are less likely to seek 
preventative care, such as chronic disease management, and often do not have a regular source of 
care or continuity of care.159 One study found that over 30% of non-elderly, uninsured adults 
went without needed care in the past year due to cost, compared to only 5.3% with private 
insurance and 9.5% of adults with public insurance.160 The study also found that poor access to 
health care among the uninsured was due, in part, because over 40% reported they did not have a 
regular source of care.161 Individuals without a regular source of health care are more likely to 
delay seeking emergency medical services, which can compromise health outcomes.162 Without 
properly managing chronic diseases, uninsured individuals with chronic illness have consistently 
worse clinical outcomes than insured patients.163 To illustrate, on average uninsured cancer 
patients die sooner due to delayed diagnosis compared to insured cancer patients.164 Uninsured 
individuals are also less likely to receive regular outpatient care and therefore are more likely to 
seek in-patient hospitalization for “avoidable health problems” and experience overall declines in 
health.165 When hospitalized, uninsured patients have a higher mortality rate compared to insured 
patients.166 Uninsured patients receiving in-patient care receive fewer diagnostic and therapeutic 
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services, have an increased risk of resultant injury due to substandard care, and have a greater 
risk of dying shortly after discharge.167  
Evidence across multiple research studies consistently shows that adults who are 
uninsured have poorer health outcomes and die prematurely.168 Even short periods (one to four 
years) without insurance can result in a decline in general health, and receiving insufficient 
medical care or receiving care too late can have harmful effects on health.169 Studies have found 
that adults have an increased risk of premature death when they are uninsured for longer periods 
of time.170 Lacking insurance is correlated with a worse quality of life than those with insurance, 
due to poorer health status and shorter length of life.171 A lack of insurance also exacerbates 
disparities in morbidity and mortality rates among racial and ethnic groups.172 Vulnerable 
populations, such as racial minorities and low-SES populations, are already at risk of worse 
health and would benefit the most from obtaining insurance coverage.173 Research shows that 
gaining back insurance coverage after being uninsured simultaneously improves access to health 
care and lessens the adverse effects of having been previously uninsured.174  
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4.2.4 Health Outcomes of Uninsured Children 
Children without health insurance coverage risk neglecting needed health care visits 
critical for healthy child development. In 2019, over 10% of uninsured children did not get 
needed medical care due to cost, compared to less than 1% of children with private insurance.175 
Further, 20% of uninsured children did not see a physician in the past year, compared to only 
3.5% of insured children.176 Evidence shows that providing health insurance coverage to 
previously uninsured, Medicaid and CHIP-eligible children results in “significantly better health 
status; improved access to medical, preventative, and dental care; greater use of preventative 
services; [and] a higher quality of well-child care[.]”177  
Public health insurance programs like CHIP substantially increase a child’s likelihood of 
receiving care and sustaining good health. Conversely, a lack of insurance coverage increases a 
child’s risk for illness and stress. Research suggests that “excessive and persistent adversity” in 
early life can lead to long-term health consequences into adulthood.178 A high frequency of stress 
response activation in childhood can lead to greater risk for stress-related diseases in adulthood, 
including “cardiovascular disease, obesity, type 2 diabetes, respiratory and immunological 
disorders, and a range of mental health problems.”179 Furthermore, when the immune system is 
activated, the body experiences an inflammatory response necessary to attack invading bacteria 
and viruses.180 A constant state of inflammatory activation, however, leads to organ damage and 
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a less efficient immune response.181 Thus, researchers believe frequent immune system 
activation in early life makes children “more susceptible to recurrent infection and more prone to 
develop[ing] chronic inflammatory conditions [,] . . . including heart disease, diabetes, 
depression, arthritis, gastrointestinal disorders, autoimmune disorders, multiple types of cancer, 
and dementia[.]”182 
 Uninsured children are also at risk of suffering developmental delays that could 
negatively impact academic achievement and opportunity later in life.183 A “path can be traced” 
between lacking health insurance and a child failing to fulfill their academic potential.184 
Evidence shows that a relationship exists between illness, absence in school, and learning.185 If 
an ill child cannot receive care, they are likely to miss more school, and therefore cannot fully 
benefit from their education and are unable to achieve typical developmental milestones.186 
Adequate care both improves health outcomes and enables normal development to ensure a child 
has the opportunity to succeed in their education and into the future.187  
4.2.5 Discussion 
 In 2018, over 6.3 million foreign-born people living in the U.S. reported earnings below 
the federal poverty level.188 Though difficult to estimate, these numbers suggest that millions of 
immigrants could potentially disenroll from Medicaid or choose not to enroll themselves or their 
children in Medicaid and CHIP. Noncitizens who become uninsured risk significant harm to their 
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health, and premature death in severe cases. Noncitizen parents disenrolling their noncitizen and 
U.S. citizen children from Medicaid and CHIP due to the “chilling effect” of the Public Charge 
Rule could lead to lasting, damaging health, economic, and social consequences for the child. 
4.3 The Rule Will Have Negative Economic Impacts  
The Public Charge Rule could lead to millions of immigrants and their family members 
to disenroll from Medicaid and CHIP, causing widespread downstream costs. Immigrants and 
their families who lose insurance coverage will bear the financial burden of paying for their own 
care, and costs stemming from poorer health. A rise in uncompensated care increases the cost-
burden on hospitals, potentially leading to hospital closures. Uncompensated care is largely paid 
for by public support from federal, state, and local governments; a rise in uncompensated care 
will ultimately lead to an increased local tax burden on taxpayers to fund public support for 
hospitals.   
 4.3.1 Financial Impact on Noncitizen Persons and Families   
Uninsured families often have lower income and are therefore less likely to use health 
care services due to cost.189 As a result, the ‘‘lost utilization” of medical care becomes costly 
when poor health, disability, and premature death ensues.190 When uninsured families use health 
care, they bear a disproportionately higher percentage of costs from high out-of-pocket expenses, 
causing financial stress and insecurity.191 Research shows that uninsured individuals pay for 
nearly half of their health care out-of-pocket each year.192 Furthermore, hospitals often charge 
uninsured patients higher rates compared to rates charged against private and public insurers.193 
A 2019 study found that over 75% of uninsured adults reported they were “very or somewhat 
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worried about paying medical bills[,]” compared to only 47.6% of adults with public insurance, 
and 46.1% of adults with private insurance.194 Moreover, uninsured adults were almost 2 times 
as likely to have problems paying medical bills compared to privately insured adults (24.1% 
versus 11.6%).195 In contrast, a 2017 study found that providing insurance coverage to previously 
uninsured, Medicaid and CHIP-eligible children reduced out-of pocket costs and the overall 
family financial burden, saving families “approximately $2,886 per year per child insured.”196 
Medicaid and CHIP are crucial programs for low-income families to maintain their financial 
security, stability, and health status. 
4.3.2 Direct Costs of Uncompensated Health Care 
“Noncitizens and their families that drop or forgo Medicaid or CHIP coverage as 
a result of the Public Charge Rule will continue to have the same health care 
needs. But now they will likely postpone treatment, forcing hospitals to provide 
uncompensated care in emergency rooms for conditions that could have been 
treated, or even prevented, through primary-care visits. These added costs will 
likely prevent hospitals from fully serving their patients and communities.” 
- American Hospital Association et. al., Amici Curiae Brief to United States 
District Court Northern District of California197  
 The national cost of uncompensated care for community hospitals totaled $41.3 billion in 
2018, not including underpayment from Medicaid and Medicare.198 More than $660 billion in 
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uncompensated care has been provided by hospitals since 2000.199 This cost burden of billions is 
shared among both public and private entities, though ultimately, individuals acting as taxpayers, 
health care providers, employees, and health care consumers bear the majority of unmet costs.200 
Hospitals cover costs of uncompensated care through federal, state, and local programs 
and subsidies, private health insurance, philanthropic support, and hospitals’ own-sourced funds, 
such as private payer and self-pay surplus.201 In an amicus brief opposing the Public Charge 
Rule, the American Hospital Association (AHA) and other health care groups wrote that 
“hospitals are at risk of spending as much as $17 billion dollars every year in additional 
uncompensated care costs” as a result of the Public Charge Rule.202 Furthermore, the AHA 
claimed the Public Charge Rule would force hospitals to provide uncompensated care in their 
emergency departments— the most expensive health care setting.203 The UnitedHealth Group 
reported that “[t]reating conditions that should be managed in the primary care setting costs 12 
times more” when delivered in a hospital’s emergency department.204 The AHA also claimed 
that public and safety-net hospitals located and operating in “predominantly immigrant and 
lower-income communities” would face the largest burden of uncompensated care.205 A sharp 
increase in uninsured patients will force public and safety-net hospitals already in precarious 
financial positions “to make difficult operational and financial decisions, including whether they 
must limit certain other services, close free clinics, or shut down entirely.”206  
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Despite the cost burden of uncompensated care on hospitals, between 75% and 85% of 
total direct costs of uncompensated care per year is paid for by public support from federal, state, 
and local governments.207 Federal subsidies account for 60% of governmental support funding 
uncompensated care costs in hospitals, through federal Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate 
share hospital (DSH) payments, portions of Medicare payments that support services to 
medically indigent patients, and supplemental Medicaid financing such as upper-payment limit 
(UPL) mechanisms.208 Hospitals also receive state and local subsidies and are allocated budget 
funds for hospital care and operational costs.209 State and local governments support 
uncompensated care in hospitals through tax appropriations, funding for indigent care programs, 
and Medicaid DHS and UPL payments.210 When states provide in-kind care to the medically 
indigent, the direct costs disproportionately fall onto the local area where care is provided.211 
Most direct costs for uncompensated care burden the average taxpayer and health care consumer 
in the form of higher local taxes, and a reduction of available funds and resources for other 
public programs.212 
4.3.3 Spillover & Opportunity Costs from Poor Health Outcomes 
The vast majority of costs produced by a large uninsured population are not direct costs 
from uncompensated care, but rather result from the poorer health outcomes of those without 
insurance.213 These “spillover costs” felt across communities emerge as financial risk and 
uncertainty experienced by individuals with poor health, demand on local budgets, a loss of 
public health resources, and less control of chronic and communicable diseases.214 
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Uncompensated care also causes higher fiscal costs for other public programs, including 
Medicare, Social Security Disability Insurance, and the criminal justice system.215  
One last effect of uncompensated care is the opportunity cost, or loss of valued life. 
Opportunity costs account for losses of productivity that accrue by those experiencing poorer 
health.216 The Institute of Medicine estimates that the aggregate, annual economic cost of poor 
health and premature death caused by uninsurance is between $65 and $130 billion per year 
uninsured.217 These opportunity costs are the benefits that could be realized if acquiring 
insurance reduced both morbidity and mortality to the levels of comparable, insured 
individuals.218  
 4.3.4 Discussion 
The Public Charge Rule not only financially burdens the immigrants and families who 
become uninsured— it also has negative downstream economic implications for their entire 
communities. As noted in Section 4.1 of the Analysis section, former White House Press 
Secretary Stephanie Grisham claimed the Public Charge Rule would protect American taxpayers. 
In reality, the Rule induces additional financial burden on taxpayers through raised local taxes. A 
rise in uncompensated care depletes local resources and funding for other publicly funded 
community programs too. Public and safety-net hospitals closing due to increased 
uncompensated care depletes local accessibility of health care, and consequently threatens the 
health and livelihood of the low-income communities they serve. Local economies will also have 
to face the billions of dollars in opportunity costs from unemployed immigrants who grow ill 
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from inadequate health care and cannot work. These cumulative costs caused by the Public 
Charge Rule are systemic and will undeniably arise soon.  
4.4 Impacts of COVID-19 on the Hispanic Population  
 The U.S. Hispanic population has experienced significant economic impacts and 
concerning health outcomes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence indicates that 
Hispanic people are 1.3 times as likely to contract COVID-19 compared to non-Hispanic whites, 
and experience disproportionately higher mortality rates once they contract the virus.219 
Compared to non-Hispanic whites, Hispanic people are also 3.1 times as likely to be hospitalized 
for COVID-19 and 2.3 times as likely to die from COVID-19.220 Although racial minorities were 
found to be more likely than non-Hispanic whites to alter behaviors to help reduce the spread of 
the virus, Hispanic people experience inherent structural factors that increase their risk of 
contracting COVID-19.221 For example, both Hispanic people and immigrants generally are 
“more likely to be essential employees with jobs that require them to leave their homes and place 
themselves and their families at risk.”222 Additionally, 27% of the Hispanic population lived in 
multigenerational households in 2016, defined as “including two or more adult generations, or 
including grandparents and grandchildren younger than 25.”223 Hispanic people are also “more 
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likely to live in crowded households due to a lack of living wage and unaffordable housing.”224 
These factors make following social distancing guidelines difficult for Hispanic families and 
therefore increase the risk of spreading COVID-19 to family members living in the same 
household.225 
 The Hispanic population has also been “particularly hit hard by the economic fallout of 
the pandemic.”226 Between the third quarters of 2019 and 2020, the unemployment rate for all 
Hispanic people rose from 4.2% to 11.2%, and rose 4.8% to 12.5% for Hispanic women.227 
Approximately 29% of Hispanic families experienced a job loss due to COVID-19 by someone 
in their household.228 Similarly, 33% of Hispanic parents have experienced drops in revenue or 
had to shut down their small-businesses.229 With a rise in unemployment, many Hispanic people 
have lost employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Many are also facing housing 
insecurity as 41% of Hispanic parents report having trouble paying rent or mortgage.230 The 
intersectionality of unemployment, being uninsured, experiencing housing insecurity, and having 
an increased risk of contracting and dying from COVID-19 makes the Hispanic population 
particularly vulnerable to policies like the Public Charge Rule in the present moment.  
 
 
                                                 
224 Miriam Delaney Heard, The Effects of COVID-19 on America’s Hispanic and Latinx Communities, NAT’L 
HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Aug. 11, 2020), https://healthlaw.org/the-effects-of-covid-19-on-americas-hispanic-and-
latinx-communities/. 
225 Id.  
226 Artiga et al., supra note 117.  
227 Id.  
228 Sanchez et al., supra note 219.  
229 Id.  
230 Id.  
 41 
 
5.0 SUMMARY— PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS  
The public health implications of the Public Charge Rule for the U.S. Hispanic 
population are momentous. The Public Charge Rule makes an immigrant inadmissible or 
ineligible for an adjustment of immigration status if they are deemed “likely at any time to 
become a public charge;” a public charge determination is characterized by a likelihood of 
receiving public benefits, like Medicaid.231 Over a third of the U.S. Hispanic population were 
immigrants in 2018, and half of the U.S. foreign-born population identified as Hispanic. 232 
Hispanic people comprise a significant portion of Medicaid enrollees, accounting for almost one 
third of all Medicaid enrollees in 2018.233 Medicaid also covers more than half of all Hispanic 
children.234 The Public Charge Rule’s chilling effect is causing immigrants to disenroll or not to 
enroll themselves and their family members, regardless of their U.S. citizenship, in Medicaid and 
CHIP “due to fears and uncertainty” surrounding the Rule.235 Millions of  Medicaid and CHIP 
enrollees live in mixed immigration status households,236 and sources estimate that up to 23 
million noncitizens and their U.S. citizen family members using public benefits could disenroll 
from crucial benefit programs.237 
A loss of insurance is a major barrier to accessing health care services for low-income 
individuals and is directly correlated with poorer health outcomes and premature death.238 A loss 
of insurance for a child risks neglecting health care visits critical for healthy child development, 
diminished academic attainment, and long-term health consequences into adulthood. A loss of 
Medicaid can also create serious financial insecurity since uninsured individuals pay for nearly 
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half of their care costs out-of-pocket per year.239 The U.S. Hispanic population already has a 
disproportionately higher rate of poverty compared to other racial groups.240 Since poor health 
declines an individual’s SES and, likewise, poverty generates poor health outcomes,241 millions 
of Hispanic immigrants and their U.S. citizen family members disenrolling from Medicaid and 
CHIP will be condemned to the incessant feedback loop of uninsurance, poverty, and poor health 
outcomes. In addition, Hispanic people are experiencing this negative feedback loop amidst the 
deadly threat of COVID-19, which creates an even greater risk of poor health outcomes or death.  
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6.0 IMMIGRATION REFORM WITH THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION  
President Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential campaign ran in part on the promise to reform 
America’s immigration system, and “take urgent action” to undue damage caused by harmful 
immigration policies implemented by the former Trump administration.242 In particular, Biden 
pledged to “[r]everse Trump’s public charge rule” because the “discriminatory” rule 
“undermines America’s character as [a] land of opportunity” by admitting only the wealthy.243 
On February 2, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order Number 14012 titled “Restoring 
Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and Inclusion Efforts for 
New Americans.”244 Section 4 of the Executive Order prompted a review by the Secretary of 
State, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and other agency heads to “review all 
agency actions related to implementation of the public charge ground of inadmissibility in 
section 212(a)(4) of the . . . [INA], and the related ground of deportability in section 237(a)(5) of 
the INA[.]”245 As of April 2021, the review by DHS, in consultation with the Departments of 
Justice and States and other agencies, is still ongoing.246  
As mentioned previously, on November 3, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit stayed the November 2, 2020 decision by the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois to vacate the Public Charge Rule nationwide. On March 9, 2021, 
“DHS moved to dismiss its appeal before the Seventh Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit dismissed 
its appeal” causing the original November 2nd order to vacate the Public Charge Rule to go into 
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effect, thereby preventing the Rule from being in effect.247 That same day, DHS Secretary 
Alejandro N. Mayorkas announced that “the government will no longer defend the 2019 public 
charge rule as doing so is neither in the public interest nor an efficient use of limited government 
resources.”248 On March 15, DHS published the “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds; 
Implementation of Vacatur” rule, effected on March 9, 2021, that “implement[ed] the district 
court’s vacatur of the [Public Charge Rule],” causing the Rule to “no longer [have] any legal 
effect[.]”249 With this vacatur, USCIS immediately stopped applying the Public Charge Rule to 
all pending applications and petitions.250 USCIS is now applying the public charge 
inadmissibility statute in accordance with the 1999 Interim Field Guidance, the standard that was 
in place before the Public Charge Rule was employed.251 Similarly, USCIS is not applying the 
“public benefits condition” to pending applications and petitions for extension of stay or change 
of status.252 USCIS is not considering any information related to the Public Charge Rule in 
applications already submitted.253 
Although the Seventh Circuit’s March 9th decision to lift its stay may feel like a 
victorious moment in this Public Charge Rule debate, several Republican state attorneys general 
who support the Public Charge Rule are currently “turning to the courts in hopes of preserving” 
Trump’s former immigration agenda.254 As of March 15, 2021, a dozen Republican state 
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attorneys led by the attorneys general offices of Mark Brnovich (Arizona, R) and Ken Paxton 
(Texas, R) are “seeking to litigate the [Public Charge Rule] issue in three different federal 
appeals courts” with hopes of eventually reaching the Supreme Court.255 Brnovich has publicly 
defended the Public Charge Rule, claiming the Rule “‘[e]nsures our government welfare 
programs won’t be overrun.’”256 In a motion to intervene the Public Charge Rule decision on 
March 10, 2021, Brnovich addressed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that “U.S. 
states would collectively pay out an additional $1 billion annually in public benefits if the 2019 
[Public Charge Rule] were struck down.”257  
Courts generally view immigration law as “the exclusive purview of the federal 
government” and therefore legal challenges to the Public Charge Rule will likely “face an uphill 
battle.”258 Nevertheless, legal challenges to Biden’s immigration reforms will continue to mount 
as lawmakers are unlikely to reach bipartisan agreement on immigration issues.259 Also, because 
immigration reform is so politically polarized, it is very possible the Public Charge Rule could be 
supported by the next Republican presidential administration. Consequently, the future of the 
Public Charge Rule is uncertain. 
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7.0 POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Since the vacatur, USCIS is not applying the Public Charge Rule, and therefore is not 
considering any use of public benefits to any pending applications, submitted applications, or 
petitions for extension of stay or charge of status. Nevertheless, Republican state attorneys 
general are seeking to litigate the Public Charge Rule issue. The future of the Public Charge Rule 
will ultimately be determined by the federal courts. The Supreme Court is the “final arbiter” and 
has “plenary authority to vacate the decisions of the lower courts when the circumstances 
warrant that action.”260 Since the Public Charge Rule vacatur is currently being challenged in 
three federal appeals courts and could eventually reach the Supreme Court, the future of the Rule 
is uncertain. Thus, the Public Charge Rule still has potential future public health implications for 
affected immigrants and their family members.  
If the Public Charge Rule vacatur is reversed and the Rule is put into effect again, DHS 
should remove Medicaid from the list of public benefits considered during a public charge 
determination. Although all public benefit programs are useful resources for low-SES 
immigrant families, Medicaid is a crucial benefit that directly impacts health outcomes for 
millions of enrollees. Without Medicaid coverage, low-SES immigrants and their family 
members are unlikely to be able to afford other forms of health insurance. Therefore, millions of 
immigrants and their family members may go uninsured and risk severe adverse health 
outcomes. 
  
                                                 





The Public Charge Rule will lead to a significant decrease in Medicaid enrollment by 
otherwise eligible, noncitizen immigrants and their family members. A loss of insurance 
coverage will cause poor health outcomes for immigrants and their children. The Rule will also 
cause downstream tax burdens on local economies due to a rise in uncompensated care provided 
in hospitals. The Public Charge Rule’s alleged purposes purported by the former Trump 
administration are unfulfilled. Instead, the Public Charge Rule discriminates against immigrants 
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